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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper considers whether it is differences in technical efficiency or differences in factor 
endowments that explain productivity differentials in Moldovan agriculture.  We compute 
non-parametric measures of technical efficiency for a sample of Moldovan small-holders 
using the four-step Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach suggested by Fried, Schmidt 
and Yaisawang (1999).  We also consider a model of class structure inspired by the work of 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), and estimate a bivariate probit model that explains a household's 
labor market participation decisions (and hence class membership) in terms of its factor 
endowments.  These constructs are then used in an effort to understand the determinants of 
output per hectare in Moldovan agriculture.  We find that differences in technical efficiency 
explain very little of the great heterogeneity in productivity observed in our sample, while 
class membership is slightly more successful.  Our empirical model of class structure suggests 
that self sufficient households will disappear and be replaced by a class of small capitalist 
farmers as land and credit markets develop. 
 
Key words: transaction costs, technical efficiency, household model, transitional economy, 
agrarian reform 
 
JEL: D23, D24, D13, P32, Q13 
 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2006.12 
 
—3—
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper considers the determinants of agrarian organization and productivity in transition 
economies, focusing on the specific case of Moldova.  The debate is a particularly interesting 
one, first because it highlights the relative advantages of different empirical approaches and, 
second, because implications of the competing approaches in terms of the future evolution of 
agrarian structure are fundamentally different.  The basic question we seek to answer is the 
following: what determines productivity differentials among small-scale producers in 
Moldova ?   
 
In order to provide some empirical motivation for what follows, Figure 1 displays a kernel 
density estimate of output per hectare for a sample of 1,019  Moldovan small-holders in 1996 
and highlights the great dispersion in productivity.   There are at least two ways in which 
these productivity differentials may be explained.  First, it may be that there are important 
differences in the efficiency of producers.  Differences in the relative deviation with respect to 
the efficient frontier will then explain productivity differences.  This has been the explanation 
chosen by most authors working on the agricultural sector of transition economies.  Second, it 
may be that there are significant differences in input choices among producers, although 
production decisions do lie on the relevant isoquant (frontier).  These explanations are not 
mutually exclusive in that it may be a combination of heterogeneity in productive efficiency 
and in input use that explains observed productivity differentials.  In this paper, one of our 
aims is to disentangle these two competing explanations and to assess their relative 
importance. 
 
In the present paper, it will be shown, at least for the case of Moldova, that non-parametric 
methods (Data Envelopment Analysis) commonly used in the study of the efficiency of 
agricultural producers in transition economies provide only part of the explanation for 
observed differences in productivity among small farmers.  In producer theory parlance, this 
means that the distance from the isoquant constitutes only a small part of what differentiates 
producers.  Given that measures of technical efficiency for Moldovan small-holders are 
extremely concentrated and display relatively little heterogeneity, it is not surprizing that 
these measures of efficiency are not able to explain a very important portion of the observed 
heterogeneity in productivity. 
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Our complementary explanation for productivity differentials is based on a model of class 
structure.  Differences in constraints faced by producers, particularly in terms of access to 
credit, lead to different degrees of participation in the labor market which in turn lead to 
productivity differentials.  These productivity differentials are entirely consistent with 
productive efficiency (in the sense of being on the isoquant) and follow from differences in 
factor endowments. 
 
If differences in productive efficiency do not explain an important portion of productivity 
differentials among producers, it follows that class membership may provide part of the 
answer to the productivity puzzle.  Access to credit is one important factor that may determine 
class membership.  Factors that will lead to farmers moving from one class to another will 
then constitute one of the channels through which the overall productivity of Moldovan 
agriculture will evolve.   
 
A case in point is provided by farmers who are in a state of autarky in that they do not 
participate at all in the labor market: we find that the probability of a farmer belonging to this 
class is a decreasing function of access to credit and land ownership.  This suggests, as the 
land sale market is liberalized (and more productive producers buy out less productive ones), 
that there will be a decrease in the relative importance of this class of producers, who also 
display the lowest productivity levels.  Average productivity in the agricultural sector will 
then increase not because producers become more efficient, but rather because constraints that 
affect their participation on factor markets are loosened thereby allowing them to reduce the 
deviation with respect to the first-best optimum. 
 
The relative efficiency of producers in transition economies 
 
Most of the literature on the agricultural sector in transition economies has been concerned 
with measuring the relative efficiency of different types of producers.  In particular, a number 
of studies have considered the relative efficiency of large collective farms versus that of 
small-scale producers, using either non-parametric methods (Data Envelopment Analysis) or 
parametric (stochastic frontier) approaches.  Representative studies include Mathijs and 
Swinnen (2001), Mathijs et Vranken (1999), Piesse, Thirtle et Turk (1996), Brooks et Meurs 
(1994)  and Brada et King (1993). 
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Though interesting, these results suffer from a fundamental flaw :  it is inappropriate to 
compute measures of relative efficiency through methods such as DEA while pooling 
producers with intrinsically different organizational forms.  In other words, while one may 
compute the relative efficiency of different large-scale farms with respect to each other, and 
do the same for small-scale producers, one may not directly compute relative efficiency 
measures in a dataset that includes both categories of producers.  Parametric methods such as 
the estimation of production or cost frontiers over a heterogeneous sample of large and small 
producers are also inappropriate in that the underlying assumption is that they share the same 
production technology (the deterministic portion of the frontier): this assumption is patently 
untenable.  It is therefore not possible to provide an empirically motivated answer to the 
question of whether large (ex collective) farms are more or less efficient than small-scale 
producers.  On the other hand, it is possible to analyze the relative degree of inefficiency of 
small-scale producers as a group, and to analyze the determinants of any differences that may 
be detected. 
 
2. NON-PARAMETRIC APPROACHES 
 
Differences in the efficiency of farms can be attributed to two distinct sets of factors: (i) intra-
farm characteristics, and (ii) inter-farm differences in the environment.  The ranking 
computed by traditional DEA methods does not allow one to distinguish between these two 
sources of differences in efficiency.  The four-step methodology recently proposed by Fried, 
Schmidt and Yaisawang (1999) does.  
 
In the first step, one computes conventional efficiency scores using the standard input-
oriented DEA method.  This approach would appear to be that most appropriate to agricultural 
producers in transition economies since their oft-stated objective is to maintain a given level 
of output while facing shortages of various inputs. We assume variable returns to scale 
(Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984), allowing us to compute technical efficiency scores 
purged of scale efficiency effects.  This first stage yields conventional efficiency scores as 
well as a total input slack for each of the inputs under consideration. 
 
In the second step, each total input slack is regressed on a set of variables that characterise the 
environment faced by the farm.  Given that total input slacks are bounded from below by 
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zero, a tobit specification is appropriate.  This second stage allows conventional statistical 
inference regarding the determinants of each of the total input slacks.1   
 
Different environmental factors have been suggested in the literature. In the present context, 
we consider seven factors: (i) human capital (years of education of the head of the farm), (ii) 
age of the farm, (iii) the availability of credit (a dummy variable equal to one when the farm 
can obtain credit), and the quantity of credit obtained, (iv) government aid received, (v) the 
level of investments undertaken, (vi) non-farm income available (constituted in large part by 
migrant remittances), (vii) the amount of land tax paid and (viii) the availability of irrigation 
equipment, electricity, water and roads, as well access to common property resources. 
 
Factors (iii) and (iv) (government aid and credit) represent a softening of the budget constraint 
and, according to the usual incentive arguments, should increase inefficiency.  Factors (v) and 
(viii) (investment, irrigation, etc.), on the other hand, should be associated with a decrease in 
inefficiency. Factor (vii) (land tax) should increase inefficiency through the usual 
distortionary effects of taxation.  Factor (i) (human capital) is expected to increase efficiency, 
but is sometimes associated with perverse effects in the context of developing country 
agriculture.   
 
There remains factor (vi) (non-farm income).  On the one hand, a rise in non-farm income 
should render the credit constraint faced by the farm less binding and should increase wastage 
and therefore inefficiency. On the other, non-farm income may not be treated as part of 
revenue in the credit constraint, especially when it stems from migrant remittances.  This is 
because migrant remittances, in many contexts, are allocated (sometimes explicitly by the 
migrant) to productive investments on the farm.  As such, an increase in this form of revenue 
may be associated with investment activity and thus with an increase of efficiency.  
 
In the third step, one computes adjusted inputs, defined as the observed level of the input, plus 
the difference between the maximum fitted value of the input slack and the fitted value of the 
input slack for the producer in question.  Since the maximum fitted value of the input slack 
corresponds to the worst environment faced by any farm in the sample, this step effectively 
                                                 
1
 In addition to the references cited above, several recent papers examine the determinants of technical efficiency 
in agriculture.  They include, Gallagher, Goetz and Debertin, 1997, Ngwenya, Battese and Fleming, 1997, and 
Jones, Klinedinst and Rock, 1998. 
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places all producers in the same conditions.  Finally, in the fourth step, conventional DEA 
estimation is used to recomputed efficiency scores, where one uses the adjusted inputs in 
place of the actual inputs. 
 
3. THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF SMALL-SCALE PRODUCERS:  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR MOLDOVA 
 
The data used in this paper stem from a survey undertaken by the World Bank and the Agency 
for Agricultural Restructuring between February and April 1997, at which point the reform 
process in Moldova was well underway.  The survey covers 28 out of 36 districts over the 
three agro-climatic zones (North, Center, South) of the country.  Small farms included in the 
survey were randomly drawn at the village level. 
 
As of mid-1996, 91.4% of agricultural land was deemed to have been "privatized" and 
983,000 households had rights to a land share.  These ownership certificates represented a 
total of 2.2 million plots of land with the average plot size being 1.5 hectares.  These figures 
are somewhat misleading since, as of April 1998, only 21% of land was being cultivated as 
household plots or as independent family farms.  Many kolkhozes had already been 
technically dismantled but continued apparently to appropriate a large share of arable land. 
 
Most (95%) of the small-holders included in our sample engage in agricultural production and 
animal husbandry.   Most (94%) of these producers operate on the plots that were 
redistributed to peasants during the privatization process, with an average farm size of 2.4 
hectares.  For the remainder, who rent in land, average farm size was of 7.5 hectares (the 
average amount of land rented in was equal to 4.2 hectares). 
 
Agricultural technology used by Moldovan small-holders follows traditional patterns although 
some producers do use chemical fertilisers and new seed varieties.  Individuals who are 
members of large (former collective) farms enjoy preferential access to subsidized inputs to 
be used on their own household plots which explains their continued membership in these 
organizations.  Agricultural machinery was largely distributed to the former collective farms: 
among small-holders, only 10% possess a tractor. 
 
Results corresponding to the first and fourth stages of the procedure described in part 2 are 
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presented in Table 1. The mean initial and adjusted efficiency score for small farms are 52% 
and 91%, respectively. As is obvious from the kernel estimates presented in Figure 2, 
adjusting our estimates of technical efficiency so that all small-holders are placed within the 
same environment leads to a highly concentrated distribution: the standard deviation of 
adjusted technical efficiency is equal to 0.06.  Moreover, the minimum level of adjusted 
technical efficiency is equal to 67%.   There is thus relatively little scope for increasing  the 
productivity of Moldovan small-holders by increasing their technical efficiency, at least as far 
as the full sample results are concerned. 
 
Determinants of total input slacks 
 
Though increasing technical efficiency may not offer the most promising manner of 
improving the overall productivity of Moldovan small-holders it is nevertheless interesting to 
understand what lies behind these adjusted measures, as those variables that are significant 
determinants of raw technical efficiency may be amenable to policy interventions.  Table 2 
reports results corresponding to the second stage of the procedure, whereas Table 3 presents 
the corresponding marginal impacts of the explanatory variables.  A positive coefficient 
means that an increase in the variable in question leads to an increase in the total slack and 
thus to a fall in efficiency.  
 
Surprisingly, human capital, represented by the number of years of education of the farm 
head, has no statistically significant impact on the total input slacks.2  The use of irrigation, on 
the other hand, reduces inefficiency associated with the use of the land input (as well as other, 
non-labor, inputs). Unsurprisingly, the distortionary effect of taxation, and its impact on 
efficiency is apparent:  the amount paid in land taxes increases the total slack associated with 
all three factor inputs. 
 
Credit availability, as well as the amount of credit received, in conformity with the soft budget 
constraint view that is often alluded to in order to explain inefficiency, increases the total 
slack associated with the land input and with other inputs.  The same is true for the amount of 
government aid received by the farm (all three total slacks are increased).  On the other hand, 
revenue stemming from non-agricultural activities (including transfers from migrants) 
                                                 
2
 Mathijs and Vranken (1999) found a statistically significant effect of education on total technical efficiency for 
Bulgarian and Hungarian family dairy and crop farms. 
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improves the efficiency with which land and labor are utilized (while its impact on other 
inputs is the opposite).  Similarly, an increase in farm investments increases the efficiency 
with which all three inputs are utilized.   
 
These results suggest an important distinction.  While it is true that an increase in credit 
availability can, potentially, lead to an increase in productive efficiency through a relaxation 
of the farm’s resource constraint, the fact that credit increases inefficiency when one controls 
for investment indicates that it is the disincentive effect of the soft budget constraint that 
dominates, by reducing competitive pressures on the farm.  The same argument holds for 
government aid.  On the other hand, it may at first seem surprising that non-agricultural 
income decreases inefficiency, especially in light of the negative impact of government aid 
and credit.  This result becomes less surprising when one keeps in mind that diversification of 
activities may reflect a high degree of managerial initiative, as well as the fact that a major 
component of non-agricultural income —migrant remittances— are often specifically 
earmarked for productive investment uses.  The upshot is that resources, at least in the case of 
Moldovan agriculture, are manifestly not fungible. 
 
Can differences in efficiency explain differences in productivity ? 
 
In order to assess whether differences in efficiency can provide one with a coherent 
explanation for the observed heterogeneity in the productivity of Moldovan small-holders, we 
regress output per hectare on our adjusted measure of efficiency.  If differences in efficiency 
constitute an important piece of the productivity puzzle, one would expect that they would be 
able to explain an important portion of differences in productivity.  As should be obvious 
from the results presented in the first column of Table 5, this is not the case.  Although 
adjusted technical efficiency does constitute a statistically significant determinant of 
agricultural productivity (output per hectare), it is able to account for only an infinitesimal 
share of that variable's variance (as evidenced by the extremely low R-squared).  Other 
factors, outside of differences in technical efficiency per se, must therefore lie behind the 
great heterogeneity in the productivity of Moldovan small-holders. 
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4. HOUSEHOLD MODELS AND CLASS STRUCTURE 
 
One of the most useful corollaries of the unitary household model of agricultural production 
that is extensively used in development microeconomics is constituted by models of class 
structure.  Building on the seminal contributions of Roemer (1982) and Bardhan (1982), 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) develop a household model in which credit constraints, coupled 
with supervision costs on hired labor, generate a taxonomy of peasant classes that are 
differentiated according to their participation on either side of the labor market.  Other models 
of class structure permit one to investigate the determinants of participation on other factor 
markets, such as the land rental market, or of the ability of farmers to commercially market 
their output.  The Eswaran-Kotwal (1986) model, in particular, predicts productivity 
differentials generated by class membership which in turn is determined by factor 
endowments.  Carter and Wiebe (1990) and Wydick (1999) focus on the impact of the access 
to credit on the productivity of farmers, as well as on class membership. 
 
One commonly-noted feature of the organizational structure of the agricultural sector in 
transition economies following decollectivization is the emergence of different classes of 
farmers characterized by differing degrees of participation on various markets.  While the 
process of decollectivization and the distribution of land titles was often driven by egalitarian 
goals, a good deal of heterogeneity has already emerged, leading rapidly to polarization into 
easily recognizable classes of producers.  In the case of Moldova, a number of class 
taxonomies are possible.  In what follows, we focus, in the tradition of Eswaran and Kotwal, 
on a model with four classes defined by the hiring in and hiring out of labor. 
 
Class structure: a model for Moldova 
 
Consider a simple unitary household model where a household's inelastically supplied 
endowment of labor will be denoted by  L  and its endowment of land by T .  The production 
technology will be represented by a Cobb-Douglas specification in which family labor and 
land are essential inputs, whereas hired labor may be dispensed with if it is so desired.  We 
express this by writing the production technology as ( )1 inq L L Tα β γ= + , where inL  is hired 
labor, L  is family labor used on the farm, and T  is the size (in hectares) of the farm.  The 
rental prices of labor will be assumed to differ depending upon whether one is hiring in ( 1w ) 
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or hiring out ( 2w ), where we assume that 2 1w w< .  The rental price of land will be denoted by 
r  and we choose agricultural output as the numeraire.  Apart from the technology of 
production, the household is potentially constrained by the availability of working capital or, 
in other words, credit.  We express this writing  
1 2 ( ) ( )inw L w L L r T T B− − + − ≤ , 
the usual assumption being that factor inputs must be paid for at the beginning of the season, 
while output, and hence liquidity, obtains only at the end.  In the preceding inequality, B  
denotes available liquidity.  Note that this credit constraint can be re-expressed as  
1 2 2inw L w L rT B w L rT+ + ≤ + + . 
That is, production costs (on the left-hand-side) must be less than or equal to total available 
liquidity, given by the rental value of the household's endowment of labor and land plus 
available short-term credit (which may be constituted by a roll of bills under the bed).  The 
household's optimization problem is then posed as follows: 
{ } ( ) 1 2, ,
1 2
max 1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ;
. . 0;
.
in
in inL L T
in
in
L L T w L w L L r T T
w L w L L r T T B
s t L
L L
α β γ+ − + − − −
 − − + − ≤
 ≥
 ≥
 
There are potentially eight classes in this model since there are 3 constraints ( 38 2= ).  We 
will abstract from these concerns and consider the cases which correspond to a binding credit 
constraint.3  When this is case, we can solve out for the amount of land being farmed, and 
transform our initial problem into the following maximization program: 
{ } ( ) 1 2,max 1 ( )in in inL L
w wBL L L L L T
r r r
γ
α β  + − + − + 
	 

. 
If we allow the two remaining constraints to hold with strict inequalities, the corresponding 
first-order conditions (FOCs) allow one to write: 
( )
( )
1 2
2
B w w L rT
L
w
β
α β γ
+ + +
=
+ +
,
1
1 1 2 1in
w B w w L rT
L
α α β γ
−
+ + + 
= −  + +	 

, 
and 
1
1 2B rT w w LrT
γ α β γ
−
   + + +
=    + +	 
 	 

. 
                                                 
3
 It can be shown that appropriate conditions exist under which this will be true. 
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The household will "import" labor when 0inL > , which corresponds to the condition that 
1
1 1 2 1 0w B w w L rT
α α β γ
−
+ + + 
− >  + +	 

. 
Rearranging this expression yields 
 (1) 1 2B rT w w L
β γ
α
+ 
+ > − 
	 

. 
Conversely, the household will "export" labor when its endowment of labor is greater than the 
amount of labor it desires to use on its own farm:  0L L− > .  This can be written as 
( )
( )
1 2
2
0
B w w L rT
L
w
β
α β γ
+ + +
− >
+ +
, 
which simplifies to 
(2) 2 1B rT w L w
α γ
β
 +
+ < − 
	 

. 
These two conditions are represented graphically in 2( ; )w L B rT+  space in Figure 3, with 
four classes emerging, corresponding to (i) autarky ( 0, 0in outL L= = ), (ii) type 1 labourer 
cultivators ( 0, 0in outL L= > ), (iii) type 2 labourer cultivators ( 0, 0in outL L> > ), and (iv) small 
capitalists ( 0, 0in outL L> = ).4 
 
5. CLASS STRUCTURE: EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR MOLDOVA 
 
Table 4 provides empirical results from a bivariate probit model that represents the conditions 
given by equations (1) and (2).  Ceteris paribus, our theoretical model leads us to expect that 
the probability of labor being hired in is a decreasing function of the labor endowment of the 
household and an increasing function of its endowment of land and its access to working 
capital.  Conversely, the probability of hiring out family labor should be increasing in the 
household's endowment of labor, and decreasing in its land ownership and access to working 
capital.  A number of additional explanatory variables, particularly those linked to the human 
capital and previous experience of the household head, are included as controls. 
 
As should be clear from the empirical results, the predictions of the theoretical model are 
confirmed by our estimates.  The probability of hiring in is a decreasing function of family 
                                                 
4
 The terminology is adapted from Eswaran and Kotwal (1986). 
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size (measured by the number of economically active family members) and an increasing 
function both of land ownership (in hectares) and exogenous (i.e., non-agricultural) income.5  
All of these effects are statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence.  The converse 
is true of the probability of hiring out and, once again, all of the relevant effects are 
statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence. 
 
In order to address our initial question of what lies behind the great heterogeneity in the 
output per hectare of Moldovan small-holders, Table 5 presents results where the dependant 
variable is output per hectare and explanatory variables include the household's factor 
endowments and available credit, as well as its adjusted technical efficiency score.  Note that 
we carry out four regressions, corresponding to each of the four classes suggested by our 
theoretical model of class structure.  In order to control for potential sample selection bias, we 
include the predicted probability of a given household belonging to the class in question 
computed from the bivariate probit results presented in Table 4.6 
 
The first important result to retain from Table 5 is that, once one controls for class structure 
and household endowments, technical efficiency is no longer a statistically significant 
determinant of output per hectare (the lowest p-value associated with this variable obtains in 
the type 2 laborer-cultivator class and is equal to 0.261).   In contrast, membership in a class 
per se (the coefficient associated with the predicted probability) is statistically significant in 
all but the small capitalist equation.  This is particularly true of the self sufficient class 
(households who choose to remain autarkic).  Second, the relaxation of a household's credit 
constraint increases output per hectare for type 1 laborer-cultivators, whereas it reduces output 
per hectare for small capitalists.  Third, an increase in the endowment of land decreases output 
per hectare for type 1 laborer-cultivators.  Fourth, the output per hectare of small capitalists is 
an increasing function of the household's labor endowment.  It is worth noting that a 
disappointing aspect of these estimation results is that the explanatory power of the 
specification is extremely low, with the adjusted R-squared never exceeding 0.05.   
 
In terms of the future evolution of the aggregate productivity of Moldovan agriculture, one 
must take care to interpret the bivariate probit results before turning to the productivity 
equations.  For example, consider the impact of an increase in the availability of credit to self 
                                                 
5
 We cannot consider agricultural or wage income as they are endogenous variables in the model. 
6
 As such,  these estimation results resemble those carried out in tests of "selective separability". 
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sufficient producers.  While credit does not have a statistically significant impact on the 
output per hectare of self sufficient producers, an increase in credit availability will tend to 
move members of this class toward the small capitalist class (a vertical shift in Figure 3).   If 
there is an "insufficient" number of household's in the small capitalist class with respect to the 
self sufficient class in that the marginal productivity of land is higher for the former than for 
the latter, then this shift in class structure should move one towards the equalization of the 
marginal productivity of land (and hence increase the aggregate output stemming from these 
two classes recall that the optimal allocation of land is obtained when its marginal 
productivity is equated across classes).  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The purpose of this paper was to understand why there is a great dispersion in the productivity 
of small-holders in Moldova.  Two competing explanations were considered.  First, that 
productivity differences are driven by differences in technical efficiency, which has been the 
focus of much of the empirical literature on the agricultural sector of transition countries in 
Eastern Europe and the FSU.  Second, that productivity differences can be explained in terms 
of class structure, where class structure emerges as a result of market imperfections 
(particularly in terms of access to credit) and differences in the relative factor endowments of 
different producers.  Our empirical results highlight that differences in technical efficiency do 
not furnish one with a sound explanation for productivity differentials and that, while class 
structure does contribute something, it does not represent as yet a satisfactory answer. 
 
Though the productivity puzzle remains just that —a puzzle— this paper does provide 
answers to two important questions concerning the transition process in Eastern Europe and 
the FSU, at least as far as the example of Moldova can be generalized.  To the question : "Can 
small producers escape the fetters of autarky and improve their productivity ?" our answer is 
yes, as long as the land market is liberalized and access to credit is improved, since this will 
tend to transform self sufficient producers into what Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) refer to as 
"small capitalists".  To the question: "Will the private agricultural sector become rapidly 
polarized into different agrarian classes ?" our answer is that it already is.  Moreover, certain 
classes of producers, such as those in autarky, are destined to disappear as the reform process 
moves forward and the market mechanism becomes more solidly entrenched. 
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Figure 2. Kernel Density Estimates 
Distribution of Initial and Final Performance Rankings 
(technical efficiency, variable returns to scale) 
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Table 1.
Initial and Final Results of Four-Step DEA Estimation
(1019 observations)
Average Standard
Deviation
Minimum
Initial
Results
Final
Results
Initial
Results
Final
Results
Initial
Results
Final
Results
Total Efficiency 0.1966 0.1146 0.1342 0.0977 0.0110 0.0040
Technical Efficiency 0.5179 0.9015 0.1848 0.0647 0.1250 0.6710
Scale Efficiency 0.3868 0.1293 0.2082 0.1098 0.0340 0.0040
Technical efficiency, variable returns to scale
 initial efficiency scores  adjusted efficiency scores
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
.016372
3.07314
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Table 2.   
Determinants of total input slacks 
Method of estimation: Tobit  
(1019 observations, p-values next to estimated coefficients) 
 
 
Dependents Variables 
 
Total Slack  
 (Total Land Surface) 
Total Slack 
 (Permanent Workers) 
Total Slack  
 (Other Inputs) 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Constant 0.4085 0.2371 1.1550 0.0000 -1419.6 0.0003 
Education of Head  0.0228 0.3753 0.0196 0.1677    116.9 0.0001 
Age of the farm 0.0834 0.1115 0.0190 0.5123      11.4 0.8482 
Credit (lei) 0.0000 0.8208 0.0000 0.2147        0.1 0.0297 
Credit Availability(dummy) 0.5481 0.0050 0.2873 0.0073    491.5 0.0259 
Government Grants (lei) -0.0010 0.4224 -0.0002 0.7478        1.4 0.1836 
Investments (lei) 0.0000 0.1735 0.0000 0.7444       -0.1 0.5376 
Other  Revenues (lei) 0.0001 0.0339 0.0001 0.0023        0.2 0.6710 
Land Tax (lei) 0.0046 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000        3.6 0.0000 
Irrigation (dummy) 0.3827 0.1919 0.4627 0.0045    419.2 0.2107 
Infrastructure (dummy) -0.2405 0.1970 -0.2435 0.0174   -186.5 0.3759 
Equipment (dummy) -0.0115 0.9594 -0.1225 0.3272    271.5 0.2909 
Region Center (dummy) -1.1302 0.0000 -0.2037 0.0316    541.2 0.0055 
Region North (dummy) -0.7814 0.0001 -0.1774 0.1111      48.3 0.8327 
Sigma 2.1383 0.0000 1.1870 0.0000  2441.5 0.0000 
Log-likelihood  -2149   -1607  -9219  
Note: 1 lei = 0.22 US$, "infrastructure" corresponds to a dummy variable indicating whether electricity, water 
and roads are available; equipment is constructed in the same manner. 
 
Table 3.   
Determinants of total input slacks 
Method of estimation: Tobit, Marginal Effects 
(1019 observations, p-values next to estimated coefficients) 
 
 Dependents Variables 
 Total Slack  
 (Total Land Surface) 
Total Slack 
 (Permanent Workers) 
Total Slack  
 (Other Inputs) 
 Marginal effect p-value Marginal effect p-value Marginal effect p-value 
Constant 0.3374 0.2382 1.0713 0.0000 -1070.0 0.0003 
Education of Head  0.0188 0.3753 0.0182 0.1678 88.1 0.0001 
Age of the farm 0.0689 0.1116 0.0176 0.5123 8.6 0.8482 
Credit (lei) 0.0000 0.8208 0.0000 0.2147 0.1 0.0298 
Credit Availability(dummy) 0.4528 0.0050 0.2665 0.0073 370.4 0.0260 
Government Grants (lei) -0.0008 0.4223 -0.0002 0.7478 1.0 0.1837 
Investments (lei) 0.0000 0.1735 0.0000 0.7444 -0.01 0.5376 
Other  Revenues (lei) 0.0001 0.0339 0.0001 0.0023 0.02 0.6710 
Land Tax (lei) 0.0038 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 2.73 0.0000 
Irrigation (dummy) 0.3161 0.1920 0.4292 0.0045 316.0 0.2108 
Infrastructure (dummy) -0.1987 0.1970 -0.2259 0.0174 -140.5 0.3760 
Equipment (dummy) -0.0095 0.9594 -0.1137 0.3273 204.6 0.2909 
Region Center (dummy) -0.9335 0.0000 -0.1889 0.0316 407.9 0.0055 
Region North (dummy) -0.6454 0.0001 -0.1646 0.1111 36.4 0.8327 
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Figure 3 : Partition of factor endowment space  
implied by the model of class structure 
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Table 4. 
Determinants of Class Structure: Bivariate Probit Estimation 
(1019 observations, p-values next to coefficients) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 1 0
0
inif Ly
otherwise
>
= 

 
1 0
0
outif Ly
otherwise
>
= 

 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Labor endowment  -0.1074 0.0010 0.3578 0.0000 
Land endowment   0.1809 0.0000 -0.0846 0.0020 
Exogenous revenues (lei)  0.0000 0.1750 -0.0001 0.0590 
     
Proportion of qualified hh. members 0.1403 0.4970 0.3285 0.1490 
Education of Head -0.0153 0.4710 0.0441 0.0560 
Previous employment of Head :     
farm enterprise -0.2401 0.1960 -0.8266 0.0000 
industrial or construction enterprise 0.0547 0.8260 -0.7914 0.0010 
social services -0.1821 0.4570 -0.4028 0.1030 
local administration 0.2389 0.4980 -0.5913 0.1140 
Age of the farm (years) 0.0481 0.1450 0.0551 0.0790 
Access to CPRs (dummy) 0.1486 0.1100 -0.0007 0.9940 
Infrastructure (dummy) 0.1724 0.1140 0.0549 0.6220 
Availability of technical and transport equipment (dummy) 0.2582 0.0870 -0.0373 0.7980 
Constant -0.6921 0.0190 -0.5501 0.0640 
Rho [p-value] -.106  [.002] 
Log likelihood -1196 
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Table 5. 
Determinants of Productivity: Technicial Efficiency versus Class Structure 
(OLS estimation with correction for sample-selection bias) 
 
 Full sample Self-sufficient Laborer-cultivator1 Small Capitalist Laborer-cultivator 2 
  0, 0in outL L= =  0, 0in outL L= >  0, 0in outL L> =  0, 0in outL L> >  
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Constant -389.3668 0.566 -17.6591 0.6510 -22.4582 0.5750 -17.6649 0.7680 6.8964 0.9220 
Land endowment   11.2953 0.8650 -176.6703 0.0120 -65.5558 0.3840 -139.7731 0.3650 
Labor endowment   -0.0209 0.3560 -0.0266 0.6490 0.0513 0.0130 -0.0490 0.4200 
Credit (lei)   -547.8578 0.4380 1223.4810 0.0750 -1554.6040 0.0090 -281.3031 0.7580 
Predicted probability of 
belonging to the class 
  2918.5050 0.0090 2590.4180 0.0420 389.0946 0.8660 5529.5410 0.0280 
Adjusted efficiency score 
from 4-stage DEA 
2743.181 0.000 -368.8586 0.7120 -71.7577 0.9520 2182.0660 0.2780 -2300.5710 0.2610 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0152 0.0248 0.0388 0.0220 0.0551 
Number of observations 1019     322    297    223     177 
 
 
